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Why Are Asset Markets Modeled Successfully,
But Not Their Dealers?
RAFAEL B. ROMEU*
Market-level microstructure models of asset pricing succeed where dealer-level
models do not. This study addresses this empirical difficulty in the context of for-
eign exchange dealers. New evidence is presented rejecting the latter models’
specifications of how information asymmetry and inventory accumulation affect
dealer pricing. This rejection is consistent with those of other dealer-level empir-
ical studies. A new modeling avenue may be to reconsider optimal price setting
while relaxing assumptions that specify incoming orders as the only component
through which dealer inventories evolve. This approach is consistent with inventory
evolution data and with market-level models’assumptions about currency markets.
[JEL F3, F4, G1]
H
igh-frequency data combined with recent microstructure models have deliv-
ered empirical success. For example, exchange rate models that reflect infor-
mation gathering and risk sharing in their currency-trading processes outperform a
random walk.1 In these models (often referred to as micro exchange rate models),
the exchange rate depends not just on tracked statistics of economic aggregates,
such as inflation or investment, but also on other variables that reflect the market’s
*Rafael B. Romeu is an Economist in the Caribbean II Division of the IMF’s Western Hemisphere
Department. The author thanks Roger Betancourt, Michael Binder, Juan S. Blyde, Martin Evans, Jon
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ees for helpful comments, as well as seminar participants at the Bank of Canada, the Board of Governors
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Department and the R. H. Smith Department of Finance. Thanks also to Jushan Bai for code.
1Out of sample, in the sense of Meese and Rogoff (1983). See Evans and Lyons (2002).Rafael B. Romeu
370
view of economic conditions. One can partition micro exchange rate models into
market-level (ML) models and dealer-level (DL) models. ML micro exchange rate
models study how a market-wide consensus of asset values is achieved. ML models
focus on how the entire market builds such a consensus and settles on an exchange
rate. These models can explain more than 50 percent of exchange rate movements.2
DL micro exchange rate models abstract from the market as a whole and focus
instead on price setting and risk management by individual currency market par-
ticipants, or dealers. This study explores a rift between ML models and DL mod-
els. First, it shows new empirical rejections of some DL model predictions. Next, it
shows that a basic DL assumption is inconsistent with ML models and with the
data. This may be why some DL model predictions are routinely rejected both in
this and in previous studies of equity and other asset markets.
Before explaining the difficulties with DL models put forth here, it is useful to
map exactly where they lie in the literature of exchange rates. Figure 1 partitions
the research on exchange rates into six broad categories. Traditional models of
exchange rates, which face well-known empirical difficulties, are represented by
Box (1) in Figure 1. In these models, a handful of parity conditions are assumed to
link macroeconomic activity across countries. One such condition is purchasing
power parity (PPP). PPP relates the difference in inflation rates across countries to
their exchange rate depreciation. Although empirical predictions of macroeconomic
models are generally inconsistent with exchange rate data, parity conditions are
consistent. For example, Flood and Taylor (1996) show that long-run data support
PPP and other parity conditions, as denoted in Box (2) in Figure 1.3 The upshot
of their study is given in equation (1). Exchange rate depreciation between two
periods of time (t denotes time; ∆e denotes exchange rate depreciation) depends on
publicly observable fundamental macroeconomic variables (denoted by F) and an
“unexplained” component (denoted by U):
Instead of assuming that parity conditions govern exchange rate evolution,
micro exchange rate models consider factors that drive currency market partici-
pants’price setting. Empirical ML micro exchange rate models, such as Evans and
Lyons (2002), are represented in Box (4) of Figure 1. In these models, market par-
ticipants receive economic information through order flow that they cannot learn
from public macroeconomic statistics. Order flow results from partitioning total
traded volume into either buyer-initiated transactions or seller-initiated transactions
and taking their difference. Order flow plays an important role in estimating the
exchange rate because it captures changes in expectations and risk preferences that
are absent from publicly tracked economic aggregates. The resulting exchange rate
depreciation equation (2) is almost identical to equation (1). The interest rate dif-
ferential change (denoted ∆(rt − r* t )) represents the fundamental variable, and the
∆eF U ttt =+.( ) 1
2Evans (2002).
3Also confirmed by Sarno and Taylor (2002).WHY ARE ASSET MARKETS MODELED SUCCESSFULLY?
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(5) Dealer-Level Models— 
Lyons (1995); Madhavan and 
Smidt (1991 and 1993): 




tt t eFx ∆= ∆+ ∆
(4) Empirical Market-Level 
Microstructure—Evans and 
Lyons (2002): 
* () tt t t er rx ∆= ∆ − + ∆
(6) Empirical Dealer-Level 
Tests—Lyons (1995):   
* () it it it t eI I D µ α γ =− −+
(1) Open Macroeconomics 
Theory—Parity conditions, 
such as PPP: 
*
tt t pe p =
(2) Empirical Macro—Flood 
and Taylor (1996), and 
others: ∆et = F t + Ut
e   = exchange rate (i indicates that it is set by dealer i, t indicates at date/trade t).
p    = price level (* indicates foreign).    
I   = inventory of foreign exchange (* indicates desired or optimal inventory level). 
µ  = the dealer’s best guess of the full-information value of the currency.
x  = order flow.
r  = interest rate (* indicates foreign). 
F  = publicly observable measures of economic fundamentals, for example, 
  interest rates, price levels. 
U  = exchange rate variation “unexplained” by publicly observable measures of  
  economic fundamentals.
D  = indicator that is 1 if x > 0, and is –1 if x < 0.
γ , α > 0.
Notes:
Figure 1. Partitions in the Exchange Rate Literature
Figure 1 shows the disconnect between dealer-level (DL) and market-level (ML) microstructure,
which is explored here. The exchange rate literature is partitioned into broad categories (each indicated by
a numbered box), with arrows indicating theoretical/empirical support among areas. This paper shows that
DL microstructure models predict a pricing equation (in Box (5)) that is rejected by DL empirical studies
(and hence the broken link to Box (6)). Furthermore, DL microstructure models are inconsistent with ML
microstructure models—represented by Box (3). However, ML microstructure models are empirically sup-
ported by microdata (Box (4)), and they are closely related to open macroeconomic empirical studies.
These (in Box (2)) support parity conditions from open macroeconomic models using long-run data and
the same estimating equation as predicted by ML microstructure models. Finally, the theoretical link from
open macroeconomics to ML microstructure (Box (3) and Box (1)) is under development (for example,
Evans and Lyons, 2004).Rafael B. Romeu
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“unexplained” variable of Flood and Taylor (1996) is the order flow variable
(denoted ∆xt) in Evans and Lyons (2002):
The theory that yields the empirical specification in equation (2) is based on
ML models of simultaneous trading in currency markets (see, for example, Lyons,
1997—Box (3) in Figure 1). In these models, first exchange rates are simultane-
ously set by currency dealers. These dealers must all set prices (simultaneously) at
which they are willing to buy or sell any amount of currency. Next, market partic-
ipants observe everyone else’s exchange rates and submit their orders to the others
in the market. These conditions guarantee that all dealers set the same exchange
rate, because any differences would lead to large arbitrage opportunities and unravel
the equilibrium. In equilibrium, all dealers set the same exchange rate and there are
no opportunities for arbitrage. For all dealers to know which exchange rate to set,
it must be based on publicly available information. Hence, in these models, deal-
ers’ exchange rates are common and based on publicly known order flow and
macroeconomic variables.
Actual market participants, however, are constantly changing prices in over-
the-counter currency markets.4 That is, since currency trading occurs over the
counter, at any point an individual dealer’s exchange rate may diverge from others’
in the market.5 To study price setting in this market, DL models consider an indi-
vidual dealers’ exchange rate setting—Box (5) in Figure 1. Dealers in these mod-
els set prices as they receive incoming orders from other market participants. The
initiators of the incoming orders may know more about future asset values than the
dealers receiving the orders. In this situation, the incoming orders reflect informa-
tion about future asset values and consequently drive currency prices. This is the
asymmetric information effect. Also, in these models dealers have a finite inventory
of the asset on which to draw for liquidity provision. As incoming orders drive the
dealer’s asset inventory away from her optimal level, she changes prices to induce
compensating orders. This is the inventory effect. The classic DL pricing conjec-
ture is given by Madhavan and Smidt (1991)—in Box (5) in Figure 1.
Empirical tests of DL models generally support asymmetric information
effects;6 they do not, however, find inventory effects.7 One study, Lyons (1995),
∆∆ ∆ er rx tt t t =− () + * .( ) 2
4See Evans (2002) for evidence of concurrent, unequal prices in foreign exchange markets.
5Then one may ask why the assumptions of ML models guarantee that all dealers set the same price.
The return in economic insight to modeling competitive dealers setting different prices concurrently is likely
to be small relative to the cost of overcoming the intractability of competitive market equilibrium, particu-
larly in terms of the necessary assumptions. See O’Hara (1995, Chapter 2) on precisely this intractability.
6For example, Hasbrouck (1988, 1991a, and 1991b) and Madhavan and Smidt (1991 and 1993) in
equity markets; Lyons (1995), Yao (1998), and Bjønnes and Rime (2005) for foreign exchange markets,
among others.
7Madhavan and Smidt (1991) do not find inventory effects. Madhavan and Smidt (1993) allow a chang-
ing optimal inventory level and find evidence of inventory management with a half-life of more than seven
days, suggesting quite different effects from theoretical predictions. Furthermore, they reject the hypothesis
of intraday inventory management, whereas Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) argue that if thereWHY ARE ASSET MARKETS MODELED SUCCESSFULLY?
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finds direct evidence of asymmetric information and inventory management pre-
dicted by DL inventory theory—Box (6) in Figure 1.
This study reconsiders the use of traditional dealer-level pricing specifica-
tions, and, specifically, this study reexamines the Lyons (1995) result. Evidence of
parameter instability and model misspecification in Lyons (1995) is presented.
When estimated over the full data set, that study’s DL pricing equation contains
breaks. In subsamples where no breaks are present, the results do not fully support
DL model predictions. Specifically, asymmetric information and inventory effects
are not present simultaneously in subsamples; hence, although they do not reject
the presence of asymmetric information or inventory effects in the data, the mod-
els’specifications of these effects are rejected. This is discussed further below and
is indicated by the broken link between Box (5) and Box (6) in Figure 1. Then,
Section II discusses an underlying assumption in DL models’ pricing specifica-
tion that may be behind their persistent empirical difficulties. Basically, the
assumption that inventory accumulation is driven only by incoming order flow is
questionable. This assumption is shown to be in contradiction to both the inven-
tory data and ML micro exchange rate theory. This is indicated by the broken link
between Box (3) and Box (5). Relaxing this assumption is a promising avenue for
further DL modeling. Section III concludes.
I. Reconsidering the Lyons (1995) Result
This section reconsiders the Lyons (1995) DL exchange rate model (for details,
see that study). Equation (3) gives the Lyons (1995) DL specification for how the
dealer’s price changes at each incoming trade (denoted by subscript t). Intuitively,
the change in the exchange rate is a function of the incoming order size, direction
of trade (that is, purchase or sale), and current and past inventory levels.
with predicted signs: {β1, β3, β4 > 0}, {β2, β5 < 0}.
Pt: The price of the dealer at which an incoming sale or purchase occurred.
Qjt:The incoming quantity demanded by the opposite party, that is, order flow.
It:T his is the dealer’s inventory at the time of (but not including) the incom-
ing quantity Qjt.
Dt: The indicator that picks up the direction of trade, positive for purchases,
negative for sales.
∆PQ I I D D m a tj t t t t t =+ + + + + +() 23 − − ββ β β β β 01 14 5 1 1, ( () 3
is inventory management, it occurs toward the end of the day. Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) find very slow
inventory adjustment as well, although they confirm that specialists are able to adjust inventory quickly
during large exogenous shocks if they choose to. Hence, inventory levels are voluntary, not due to volume
constraints, and must reflect long-term positions. Manaster and Mann (1996) find strong evidence that spe-
cialists do not control inventory as models would predict; rather, the exact opposite occurs. Furthermore,
Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) also find that dealers do not change quotes to induce trades as theoretically
predicted, but rather participate selectively in markets to unwind undesired positions. The general empirical
failure of inventory model predictions described above for equity markets is borne out in foreign exchange
market studies by Yao (1998) and Bjonnes and Rime (2000). Neither study can find the inventory manage-
ment results predicted by the Madhavan and Smidt (1991) model.Rafael B. Romeu
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Equation (3) predicts increasing prices with purchase orders and larger lagged
inventory, and decreasing prices with sale orders, and larger current inventory.8
The Lyons (1995) estimates of this equation are presented in Table 1.9 The esti-
mates are consistent with model predictions and significant at better than 1 per-
cent. The robustness of these estimates is the subject of this section.
Figure 2 shows evidence of parameter instability in equation (3). In each graph,
the abscissa indexes the incoming trades. The top two panels graph the probabil-
ity that the trade is a breakpoint, with P-values indicated in the ordinate (both the
F-test and the Likelihood Ratio test are reported). As the graphs show, the null
hypothesis of no break is rejected toward the middle of the sample, as well as
toward the end (the left graph uses the Chow breakpoint tests, the right uses Wald
tests). This is indicated by the declining P-values throughout the middle of the sam-
ple and again at the end. The bottom panels show how the coefficients on equation
(3) change as the regression is estimated on a rolling window of 150 transactions
(beginning with the transaction indicated on the abscissa). The bottom left panel
graphs the coefficient on incoming order flow (β1) and its t-statistic. The bottom
right panel does the same for the contemporaneous inventory coefficient (β2). While
one would expect some variation in the significance of the estimates owing to a
smaller sample, the variation should not be systematic and should reduce the esti-
mates’significance uniformly. One can observe that order flow is significant in the
8The moving average coefficient on the error term in equation (3) is predicted negative.
9The data are a one-week (843 observations) data set of a New York currency dealer of the dollar/DM
market from August 3–7, 1992. See Lyons (1995) for an extensive exposition of this data set. The Lyons
(1995) model includes a public information signal and specification of equation (3) with an extra regressor—
brokered trading, Bt. That study estimates equation (3) both with and without the public signal because of
poor measurement of the public signal in relation to the measurement of the other variables. Essentially, the
brokered trading variable has measurement error and is zero in 84 percent of the dealer’s transactions. This
section focuses on estimates without brokered trading; however, a single break is found with it included in
the Sup-F test.
Table 1. Reproduction of Lyons (1995) Original Estimates
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C −1.29 0.00 −0.96 0.34
Qjt 1.47 0.00 3.17 0.00
It −0.92 0.00 −3.38 0.00
It−1 0.72 0.00 2.76 0.01
Dt 10.30 0.00 4.77 0.00
Dt−1 −9.16 0.00 −6.28 0.00
MA(1) −0.09 0.03 −2.71 0.01
R-squared 0.22 F-statistic 39.28
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 Prob(F-statistic) 0.00
Notes: Table 1 reproduces the baseline DL model estimates of exchange rate changes given in
equation (3). (See Lyons, 1995, Table 4, p. 340). All coefficients are multiplied by 105 except the
moving average.WHY ARE ASSET MARKETS MODELED SUCCESSFULLY?
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beginning of the sample, whereas inventory is significant toward the end of the
sample. Hence, the DL model predictions of both asymmetric information (signif-
icant order flow coefficient β1) and inventory effects (significant inventory coeffi-
cient β2) appear to not hold in subsamples. To get a feel for what is occurring at
these points, Figure 3 shows the price set by the dealer. Solid vertical lines show
the end of days of the week, and dashed vertical lines show two breaks considered
in this section. The declining P-values in Figure 2 come at the end of the third day
and close to the end of the sample.
To investigate the possibility of parameter instability in equation (1), Table 2
reports the results for the presence or location of (possibly multiple) structural
breaks.10A break is found at transaction 449.11 The right column of Table 2 reports
the starting and ending observations of each of the five trading days from which the
data were recorded. As Figure 3 shows, the break occurs near the end of Wednesday
(overnight observations are removed). This break coincides with the end of a trad-
ing day; however, with three other day changes, there is no evidence to suggest that
these alone induce structural breaks. Figure 2 suggests that there is another break
toward the end of the sample; however, Sup-F tests cannot detect breaks within 5
percent of sample endpoints. On the last day of the sample, a $300 million Fed
intervention occurred after the close of the European markets.12 This event may
cause further parameter instability in the DL model estimates.13 Hence, Table 3
reports conventional break tests conducted on the trade at which the intervention
begins. The breaks and price are jointly shown in Figure 3. Given these joint
results, one may conclude that the DL model is subject to two breaks when esti-
mated on the Lyons (1995) data.
Table 4 reports estimations of the DL model on the subsamples that result from
segregating the data at the breaks. Estimates from the subsample prior to the first
break (observations 2 to 448) are in the top two lines; this subsample of data repre-
sents more than 53 percent of the available observations. The estimates reveal that
the coefficients for inventory are insignificant at conventional levels, whereas signed
10Sup-F tests are based on Andrews (1993) and Bai and Perron (1998).
11The Sup-F tests allow for heterogeneity and autocorrelation in residuals using the Andrews (1991)
method. Separate tests of the Lyons (1995) residuals fail to reject the null hypothesis of no breaks at con-
ventional significance levels, although an overnight break for the first day is found at the 10 percent signif-
icance level.
12The Federal Reserve confirms a $300 million intervention on that day but does not reveal its inter-
vention timing or strategy. The financial press widely report (ex post) the approximate intervention start.
The most precise timing is documented by the Wall Street Journal,August 10, 1992: “The Federal Reserve
Bank of New York moved to support the U.S. currency . . . as the dollar traded at 1.4720” (Linton, 1992).
That price corresponds to 12:32 p.m. in the Lyons (1995) data set, and that time is consistent with other
financial news reports.
13Models that show how interventions affect trading include Bhattacharya and Weller (1997), Vitale
(1999), Evans and Lyons (2001), Dominguez (2003), and others. For example, the Evans and Lyons (2001)
model finds evidence of portfolio balance effects from interventions. A late-day and end-of-week interven-
tion, one that occurs after other major markets (London and Tokyo) have closed for the weekend, would pre-
sumably bring to bear these effects. That is, the dealer would have very little time and fewer market
participants (since the entire market would be affected) with which to share the intervention’s portfolio
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17 6 1 5 1 2 2 6 3 01 376 451 526 601 676 751 826
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
                                            End of days                                                                 Breaks          
Source: Lyons (1995) data: New York–based dollar/DM dealer, August 3–7, 1992.
Notes: Figure 3 graphs the price set by the dealer in the top panel. The middle panel graphs 
cumulative daily incoming order flow, and the bottom panel graphs the cumulative sum of the unmodeled 
inventory evolution variable, QQ. The solid vertical lines represent the end of days; the dashed lines 
represent breaks.  
Figure 3. Price, Daily Cumulative Components of Inventory, and BreaksRafael B. Romeu
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order flow (that is, the asymmetric information effect) and the order flow indicators
are significant and estimated at magnitudes similar to the baseline estimates.
The estimates from the subsample 449 to 794 are reported in the third and
fourth lines. The order flow coefficient is now insignificant, and the inventory com-
ponents are significant at all conventional levels. These estimates suggest that
asymmetric information is not present in dealer pricing on the last two days of the
sample, which is just prior to the Fed intervention.
The third subsample, consisting of approximately 5 percent of the total avail-
able observations, likely reflects the effects of the Fed intervention. The only sig-
nificant effect (at the 10 percent level) is the asymmetric information effect, and it
seems to be an order of magnitude larger than the other subsample estimates. In
general, the model fits this section of the sample poorly.
The bottom two lines shows estimates that result from joining the third sub-
sample to the second, essentially ignoring the Fed intervention break. The Sup-F test
cannot find this break (because of its proximity to the sample endpoint), but the
Chow test rejects the null of no break at this point. Estimating these two subsamples
jointly shows order flow and the order flow indicator coefficients significant at the
10 percent level but not at 1 percent. The inventory effects are significant, and the
signs of the coefficients are as predicted (which was not the case for the Fed inter-
vention subsample alone). However, the proportion of variation explained by the
Table 2. Sup-F Tests for Location and Number of Structural Breaks
Structural Breaks
Significance = 1% End of Day
Fixed Break(s) Point(s) Monday 181




Notes: Table 2 shows the results of Sup-F tests for multiple structural breaks on equation (3). The
test finds a break at observation 449 at the 1 percent significance level. The right column shows
changes in days in the sample; breaks are not found at changes from one day to the next (overnight
observations are excluded), however, the break date is close to the change from Wednesday to
Thursday. All estimations and break tests are based on the Lyons (1995) DL specification that excludes
Bt—brokered trading. Lyons (1995) data: New York–based dollar/DM dealer, August 3–7, 1992.
Table 3. Break Test for Fed Intervention
Chow Breakpoint Test: Observation 795
F-statistic 5.8 Probability 0.00
Log likelihood ratio 40.5 Probability 0.00
Note: Table 3 shows the results of traditional break tests on the suspected entry point of the Fed
in the market.WHY ARE ASSET MARKETS MODELED SUCCESSFULLY?
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regression falls from 32 percent (without the intervention subsample) to 17 percent
(with the intervention subsample). Hence, while the estimation that averages across
the two subsamples (that is, ignoring the Fed intervention) recuperates to some
extent DL model predictions, adding observations reduces its explanatory power.14
II. A Puzzle of Microstructure Market Maker Models
DL models study the transaction prices that currency dealers set as orders arrive
throughout the trading day. They draw from equity market studies, which consider
the price-setting behavior of a “monopoly” specialist, a single market maker with
no other source of liquidity. Consistent with specialists’ inventory management
theory,15 DL models assume that dealers set prices to control an inventory that
evolves according to equation (4):16
II Q it it jt + =− 1 4 ,( )
14Furthermore, identifying the first break at the first or last observation at which the Chow test p-value
falls below 5 percent in Figure 2 (observations 392 and 541) does not change the result that the first regime
does not have inventory effects, and the second has no asymmetric information effects.
15For example, Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981), O’Hara and
Oldfield (1986), among others. It is useful to note, however, that equity market specialists on the New York
Stock Exchange compete aggressively against a limit order book that they themselves manage and, if nec-
essary, can induce orders from the trading floor through moral suasion.
16Equivalently, some models (for example, Madhavan and Smidt, 1991; or Lyons, 1995) conjecture a
pricing equation consistent with inventory of equations (4) and (5). Prices are assumed to be set according
to Pit = µit −α (Iit − I*) +γ Dt,w here I* is the dealer i’s desired inventory level, and Dt is one if the trans-
action is on the offer (that is, the aggressor purchases), and negative one if the transaction occurs on the
bid (that is, the aggressor sells). It picks up the bid-ask bounce for quantities close to zero. Hence, prices
are set according to the best estimate of the full information value and then adjusted to induce inventory-
compensating trades.
Table 4. Estimates of DL Pricing Model in Subsamples with No Breaks
CQ jt It It−1 Dt Dt−1 MA(1) Subsample Adj. R2
Coefficient −1.75 1.28 −0.354 0.12 12.60 −8.82 −0.20 2 to 448 0.32
Prob. 0.15 0.01 0.20 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coefficient −3.17 0.90 −2.04 1.86 11.00 −11.2 −0.10 449 to 794 0.30
Prob. 0.14 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
Coefficient 15.40 14.40 3.22 −2.58 −28.1 −1.65 0.10 795 to 839 −0.05
Prob. 0.38 0.06 0.39 0.43 0.30 0.92 0.54
Coefficient −0.78 1.73 −1.63 1.45 7.12 −10.1 −0.04 449 to 839 0.17
Prob. 0.77 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.40
Source: Lyons (1995) data: New York–based dollar/DM dealer, August 3–7, 1992. 
Notes:Table 4 shows estimates of the three subsamples, with breaks at observations 449 and 795.
The first break is given by the Sup-F test. The second break, observation 795, is given by the tradi-
tional F-test. The top panel reports the first subsample, observations 1 to 448. The second panel
reports estimates from observations 449 to 794. The third panel reports estimates from observations
795 to 838. The fourth panel reports the second and third subsamples estimated together. All coeffi-
cients are multiplied by 105 except the moving average.Rafael B. Romeu
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with Iit dealer i’s inventory at the beginning of period t, and Qjt, the incoming order
flow from other dealers (represented by subscript j), given by:
In equation (5), µit is dealer i’s best estimate of the full information value, v ˜t,a t   the
time of quoting. Thus, order flow is a scaled deviation of dealer i’s price from
dealer j’s expectation of v ˜t, plus an orthogonal liquidity shock, Xjt.
In the world of equations (4) and (5), price setting is used to control inven-
tory imbalances (and reduce inventory risk) owing to incoming orders. Intuitively,
the dealer’s pricing strategy reduces the randomness of the order arrival process
by balancing incoming purchases with incoming sales. Such assumptions imply
that inventory control is achieved by diverting asset prices away from the full-
information value, thus discounting the asset to attract inventory-compensating
trades. The DL model specifications for inventory effects that these assumptions
yield are consistently rejected by the data.
To find a new direction for market maker modeling, one may consider a small
part of the Lyons (1995) data set, which is shown on Table 5. The first column
indexes the observations according to the order of arrival; the second column shows
the price set by the dealer; the next columns show incoming order flow, the inven-
tory at the beginning of the trade, and a variable called QQit that is backed out of
equation (6):
QQit in equation (6) reflects inconsistencies between the data and the inventory
evolution assumed in equation (4). Consider, for example, the third incoming trade,
which was a sale to the dealer of $28.5 million. At the time of the trade, the dealer
was long $1 million. If equation (4) held, then the $28.5 million purchase would
imply a $29.5-million-long inventory at entry four. Instead, the dealer is short
$1.5 million at the next incoming trade, which implies that the inventory somehow
declined by $30.5 million between the third and the fourth trade. This decline is
II Q Q Q it it jt it + =− + 1 6 .( )
QP X jt jt it jt =− () + θµ .( ) 5
Table 5. First Five Entries of Lyons (1995) Data Set
Entry Pit Qjt It QQ
1 1.4794 −11 1
2 1.4797 −23−4
3 1.4795 −28 1 −30.5
4 1.4794 −0.5 −1.5 0.25
5 1.479 −0.75 −0.75 0
Source: Lyons (1995) data: New York–based dollar/DM dealer, August 3–7, 1992.
Notes: Table 5 shows the first five entries of the price (second column), incoming order flow
(third column), and inventory (fourth column) variables from the data set. The last column is backed
out from the equation: Iit+1 = Iit − Qjt + QQit. The generated variable QQ captures the part of inven-
tory evolution that is not due to incoming order flow. WHY ARE ASSET MARKETS MODELED SUCCESSFULLY?
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reflected in QQi3. It captures the gap in the inventory evolution that incoming order
flow did not generate.
Figure 3 graphs the daily cumulative incoming order flow and the daily cumu-
lative gap, QQ. This variable appears to be synchronized with incoming order flow.
This suggests that whatever is driving QQ may balance the asynchronous arrival of
incoming purchases and incoming sales. QQ may, for example, reflect other meth-
ods of inventory control available to the dealer.17 In this case, optimal pricing prob-
lems based on equation (4) may be misspecified. Furthermore, DL modeling of
QQ may also consider information about asset values contained similar to those
specified in equation (5) that reflect alternate sources of information available to the
dealer.18
According to both inventory management theory and market data, inventory is
strongly managed by dealers (Iit is mean-reverting), implying that E[Iit+1 − Iit] is sta-
tionary. According to equation (4), Qjt is then also stationary (which would be con-
sistent with price setting that induces a balance between incoming purchases and
sales), thereby making QQit noise. However, another possibility is that [−Qjt + QQit]
is stationary. This would imply that QQit and Qjt are economically related, and that
QQit may be a good candidate for microstructure modeling. Figure 4 plots kernel
densities of the empirical distribution of these two series (the two peaks in the dis-
17In currency markets, these methods include initiating interdealer bilateral trades, interdealer bro-
kered trades, or International Monetary Market Futures trades.
18Ho and Stoll (1983) model inventory management with two dealers and two assets, thereby includ-
ing aspects of competitive trading. Romeu (2003) models DL pricing with a dealer that takes into account
multiple methods of inventory control and multiple sources of information. See footnote 5 for an impor-
tant caveat regarding these types of models.
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Source: Lyons (1995) data: New York–based dollar/DM dealer, August 3–7, 1992.
Notes: Figure 4 shows Gaussian kernel densities for the empirical distributions of the unmodeled 
inventory evolution variable, QQ, and incoming order flow, Qjt . The two peaks in the distribution of Qjt 
most likely reflect clustering at the standard order sizes of $10 million. Rafael B. Romeu
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tribution of Qjt most likely reflect clustering at the standard order sizes of $10 mil-
lion), which appear to be similar. Table 6 gives descriptive statistics, which show
that the means of the distributions are almost equal in magnitude, the pair-wise cor-
relation is 0.64, and tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the variables’means
are equal. The similarity in distributions suggests that QQit may be a good candi-
date for microstructure modeling. Table 7 shows lag selection criteria for a vector
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for QQit and Qjt
Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. Correl.
QQ −0.39 0.00 34.45 −66 8.99 −0.55 7.44 0.64
QJT −0.39 0.45 20.00 −28 5.24 −0.29 5.44
Test for Equality of Means
Included observations: 843
Method df Value Probability
t-test 1684 0.00 1.00
Anova F-statistic (1,1684) 0.00 1.00
Source: Lyons (1995) data: New York–based dollar/DM dealer, August 3–7, 1992.
Notes:Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for the unmodeled inventory evolution variable, QQ, and
incoming order flow, Qjt. Tests for equality of means fail to reject equality, and the correlation between
the series is presented. 
Table 7. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables: QJT QQ
Exogenous variables: C
Included observations: 835
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 −5353.6 NA 1276.6 12.8 12.8 12.8
1 −5151.7 402.3 794.8 12.4 12.4 12.4
2 −5131.1 40.9* 763.8* 12.3* 12.4* 12.3*
3 −5128.3 5.6 765.9 12.3 12.4 12.3
4 −5123.6 9.2 764.7 12.3 12.4 12.4
5 −5122.0 3.3 769.0 12.3 12.4 12.4
6 −5120.0 3.8 772.8 12.3 12.5 12.4
7 −5118.4 3.0 777.4 12.3 12.5 12.4
8 −5115.2 6.3 778.8 12.3 12.5 12.4
Source: Lyons (1995) data: New York–based dollar/DM dealer, August 3–7, 1992.
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
Notes: Table 7 shows multiple lag selection tests for a vector auto regression (VAR) of the un-
modeled inventory evolution variable, QQ, and incoming order flow, Qjt. Two lags are selected by
multiple criteria. WHY ARE ASSET MARKETS MODELED SUCCESSFULLY?
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auto regression (VAR) of the variables. All tests select two lags, which are then esti-
mated in Table 8. The coefficients are significant at conventional levels and show
an inverse relationship between the lags and contemporaneous values of QQit and
Qjt. Hence, the evolution in time of incoming order flow may be compensated by
the evolution of QQit. Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of each variable to a
shock in the other. A shock in Qjt invokes an immediate response in QQit,w hich
further suggests that elements of microstructure models may be useful in explain-
ing the evolution of QQit and consequently of inventories and prices.
Finally, DL models that assume equation (4) and ML models such as Lyons
(1997) have conflicting inventory evolution assumptions. In ML models, dealers’
Table 8. Vector Auto Regression Estimates
QJT(−1) QJT(−2) QQ(−1) QQ(−2) C
QJT 0.47 [11.84] 0.24 [5.88] −0.47 [−22.69] −0.15 [−5.67] −0.35 [−2.48]
QQ 0.68 [8.72] 0.27 [3.38] −0.58 [−14.34] −0.13 [−2.60] −0.30 [−1.07]
t-statistics in [ ]
R-squared 0.39 Akaike AIC 5.67
Adj. R-squared 0.39 Schwarz SC 5.69
F-statistic 134.65 Mean dependent −0.38
Log likelihood −2377.6 S.D. dependent 5.25
Source: Lyons (1995) data: New York–based dollar/DM dealer, August 3–7, 1992.
Notes: Table 8 shows the results of a two-lag vector auto regression on the unmodeled inventory
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Source: Lyons (1995) data: New York–based dollar/DM dealer, August 3–7, 1992.
Notes: Figure 5 shows the responses of the unmodeled inventory evolution variable, QQ, and 
incoming order flow, Qjt , to a one-standard-deviation shock in the other respective variable. 
Figure 5. Impulse Responses for QQit and QjtRafael B. Romeu
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inventories change not just by incoming orders, but also by outgoing and customer
orders. That is, ML dealers (for example, Lyons, 1997—Box (3) in Figure 1)
receive incoming orders but also initiate orders with other dealers and trade with
customers. Hence, these models allow a role for customers and outgoing orders in
price determination. DL models where a dealer’s position is governed by equation
(4) only receive incoming orders. They do not incorporate these other trading
venues into the dealer’s price-setting optimization.19
III. Conclusion
This paper considers the empirical viability of (partial equilibrium) dealer-level
microstructure models. It presents new empirical results that reject the specifica-
tions of such models. The DL model of currency dealer price setting is found to
contain structural breaks when estimated on a one-week sample of currency trad-
ing. In the two relevant subsample estimations, asymmetric information effects are
rejected in one, and inventory effects are reflected in the other. That is, they do not
occur simultaneously, as the model would predict. This rejection of the DL model
is consistent with other empirical studies (see footnote 7).
Future work may investigate whether the consistent rejection of dealer-level
models stems from assumptions limiting the sources of inventory changes. In the
rejected dealer models, inventory is assumed to evolve only through incoming pur-
chases or sales. This implies that price setting is crucial for controlling inventory.
This study suggests, however, that inventory evolution may also depend on other
factors beyond incoming orders. In particular, evidence is presented of an unex-
plained component of inventory evolution that is correlated with incoming orders
and is of similar magnitude. Evidence of causality running in both directions
between this unexplained inventory component and incoming orders is presented.
Taken together, these suggest that this component may be a good candidate for
where dealer-level modeling should go next. Furthermore, including this unex-
plained component may allow the inclusion of assumptions that condition dealer
prices on incoming, outgoing, and customer orders, as in ML models.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Admati, A., and P. Pfleiderer, 1988, “A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price
Variability,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 1 (Spring), pp. 3–40.
Amihud, Y., and H. Mendelson, 1980, “Dealership Market: Marketmaking with Inventory,”
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 8 (March), pp. 31–53.
Andrews, D. W. K., 1991, “Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance
Matrix Estimation,” Econometrica, Vol. 59 (November), pp. 817–58.
———, 1993, “Testing for Parameter Instability and Structural Change with Unknown Change
Point,” Econometrica, Vol. 61 (July), pp. 821–56.
19Lyons (1995) controls empirically for outgoing orders and finds that these do not bias the effects
reported in Table 1; however, the underlying pricing relation in that model is rejected here.WHY ARE ASSET MARKETS MODELED SUCCESSFULLY?
385
Bai, J., and P. Perron, 1998, “Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple Structural
Changes,” Econometrica, Vol. 66 (January), pp. 47–78.
Bhattacharya, U., and P. Weller, 1997, “The Advantage to Hiding One’s Hand: Speculation and
Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, Vol. 39 (July), pp. 251–77.
Bjønnes, G. H., and D. Rime, 2005, “Dealer Behavior and Trading Systems in the Foreign
Exchange Market,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 75 (March), pp. 571–605.
Cao, H. H., M. D. D. Evans, and R. K. Lyons, 2005, “Inventory Information,” Journal of
Business (forthcoming).
Dominguez, K. M. E., 2003, “When Do Central Bank Interventions Influence Intra-Daily and
Longer-Term Exchange Rate Movements?” NBER Working Paper No. 9875 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Easley, D., and M. O’Hara, 1987, “Price, Trade Size, and Information in Securities Markets,”
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 19 (September), pp. 69–90.
———, 1992, “Time and the Process of Security Price Adjustment,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 47
(June), pp. 577–605.
Evans, M. D. D., 2002, “FX Trading and Exchange Rate Dynamics,” Journal of Finance,Vol. 57
(December), pp. 2405–47.
———, and R. K. Lyons, 2001, “Portfolio Balance, Price Impact, and Secret Intervention,”
NBER Working Paper No. 8356 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic
Research).
———, 2002, “Order Flow and Exchange Rate Dynamics,” Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 110 (February), pp. 170–80.
———, 2004, “A New Micro Model of Exchange Rate Dynamics,” NBER Working Paper
No. 10379 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Flood, R., and M. Taylor, 1996, “Exchange Rate Economics: What’s Wrong with the
Conventional Macro Approach?” The Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets, ed.
by J. Frankel, G. Galli, and A. Giovannini (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 
pp. 261–94.
Frankel, J., and A. Rose, 1995, “Empirical Research on Nominal Exchange Rates,” Handbook of
International Economics, Vol. 3, ed. by G. Grossman and K. Rogoff (Amsterdam: Elsevier
Science), pp. 1689–729.
Glosten, L., and P. Milgrom, 1985, “Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market
with Heterogeneously Informed Agents,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 14 (March),
pp. 71–100.
Hasbrouck, J., 1988, “Trades, Quotes, Inventories, and Information,” Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 22 (December), pp. 229–52.
———, 1991a, “Measuring the Information Content of Stock Trades,” Journal of Finance,
Vol. 46 (March), pp. 179–207.
———, 1991b, “The Summary Informativeness of Stock Trades: An Econometric Analysis,”
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 571–95.
———, and G. Sofianos, 1993, “The Trades of Market Makers: An Empirical Examination of
NYSE Specialists,” Journal of Finance Vol. 48, pp. 1565–93.
Ho, T., and H. Stoll, 1981, “Optimal Dealer Pricing Under Transactions and Return Uncertainty,”
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 9 (March), pp. 47–73.
———, 1983, “The Dynamics of Dealer Markets Under Competition,” Journal of Finance,
Vol. 38 (September), pp. 1053–74.Rafael B.Romeu
386
Ito, T., R.K. Lyons, and M. Melvin, 1998, “Is There Private Information in the FX Market? The
Tokyo Experiment,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 53 (June), pp. 1111–30.
Kyle, A., 1985, “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading,” Econometrica,Vol. 53 (November),
pp. 1315–35.
Linton, Clifton, 1992, “Dollar Likely to Fall Though Banks May Try to Slow Currency’s
Descent,” Wall Street Journal (New York), August 10, p. C13.
Lyons, R., 1995, “Tests of Microstructural Hypotheses in the Foreign Exchange Market,”
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 39 (October), pp. 321–51.
———, 1996, “Optimal Transparency in a Dealer Market with an Application to Foreign
Exchange,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 5 (July), pp. 225–54.
———, 1997, “A Simultaneous Trade Model of the Foreign Exchange Hot Potato,” Journal of
International Economics, Vol. 42 (May), pp. 275–98.
———, 1998, “Profits and Position Control: A Week of FX Dealing,” Journal of International
Money and Finance, Vol. 17 (February), pp. 97–115.
———, 2001, The Microstructure Approach to Exchange Rates (Cambridge, Massachusetts;
and London: MIT Press).
Madhavan, A., and G. Sofianos, 1998, “An Empirical Analysis of NYSE Specialist Trading,”
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 48 (May), pp. 189–210.
Madhavan, A., M. Richardson, and M. Roomans, 1997, “Why Do Security Prices Change? 
A Transaction-level Analysis of NYSE Stocks,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 10, 
pp. 1035–64.
Madhavan, A., and S. Smidt, 1991, “A Bayesian Model of Intraday Specialist Pricing,” Journal
of Financial Economics, Vol. 30 (November), pp. 99–134.
———, 1993, “An Analysis of Daily Changes in Specialist Inventories and Quotations,” Journal
of Finance, Vol. 48 (December), pp. 1595–648.
Manaster, S., and S. C. Mann, 1996, “Life in the Pits: Competitive Market Making and Inventory
Control,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 9 (Fall), pp. 953–75.
Meese, R., and K. Rogoff, 1983, “The Out-of-Sample Failure of Empirical Exchange Rate
Models,” Exchange Rate and International Macro-economics, ed. by J. Frenkel (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press).
O’Hara, M., 1995, Market Microstructure Theory (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers
Inc.).
———, and G. S. Oldfield, 1986, “The Microeconomics of Market Making,” Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 21 (December), pp. 361–76.
Romeu, R.B., 2003, “An Intraday Pricing Model of Foreign Exchange Markets” IMF Working
Paper 03/115 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Sarno, L., and M. Taylor, 2002, “Purchasing Power Parity and the Real Exchange Rate,” IMF
Staff Papers, Vol. 49 (April), pp. 65–105.
Stoll, Hans R., 1978, “The Supply of Dealer Services in Securities Markets,” Journal of Finance,
Vol. 33 (September), pp. 1133–51.
“U.S. Fed Intervenes as Dollar Nears Low Against D-Mark,” Financial Times (London), August
8, 1992, p.1.
Vitale, P., 1999, “Sterilized Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market,”
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 49 (December), pp. 245–67.
Yao, J., 1998, “Market Making in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market,” Salomon Center
Working Paper No. S-98-3 (unpublished; New York: New York University).